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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of audit
committee characteristics (size, independence, experience, gender
diversity, and frequency of meetings) on the company‘s financial
performance (ROA and ROE) in Egypt. In 2016, the Egyptian Stock
Exchange announced a new listing requirement for the audit
committee members‘ characteristics to enhance its effectiveness.
Data are gathered from the board of directors (BOD) and annual
reports of the EGX 30 index non-financial listed companies
in Egypt for the period of 2016–2018. Data is analyzed by using
panel data cross-section data analysis and correlation analysis.
The findings reveal that the audit committee size has a significant
relationship with ROA only and committee members‘ experience
is significantly related with ROE only. The other characteristics
(independence, meetings, and gender diversity) have no impact on
ROA and ROE. Such findings contribute to the literature by
providing new understandings regarding the audit committee as
a key component of corporate governance and its impact on
financial performance. It could also guide and improve the boards‘
selection of the audit committee members and gives Egyptian
regulators a better understanding of the impact of their latest
listing requirements on protecting the shareholders‘ interests and
increasing their confidence through having transparent financial
statements.
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numerous policies, procedures and ideal practises
that assist the board of any company to manage any
business challenges they may face. All the systems
put in place are there to ensure that the company
achieves
their
goals
with
best
practise,
as well as maintaining trust with stakeholders
(Masmoudi, 2021).

1. INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance includes some external and
internal instruments to reduce the agency costs
inside any corporation for an improvement in its
financial performance (Munisi & Randøy, 2013;
Peni, 2014; Tuan, 2014; Ghofar & Islam, 2015; Azar,
Sayyar, Zakaria, & Sulaiman, 2018). It involves
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Incorporation legislation in all countries
requires the appointment of boards of directors to
monitor and guide executives on important firm
decisions (Baldenius, Melumad, & Meng, 2014).
In other words, the board has a vital role in ensuring
all decisions are made in line with their corporate
governance for protecting all the stakeholders‘
interests. The board should set up some committees
like
audit,
nomination,
and
compensation
committees, to contribute to improving governance
efficiency. Such committees will work to make sure
that the firm is working in compliance with the laws,
the internal procedures and that all corporate
governance regulations are met. Not only will this
enhance the corporate governance and potentially
stop the bad practice of a company occurring, but
it will also boost financial performance because all
investors will have confidence that their trust in
the company is being looked after (FRC, 2014, 2016).
High firm performance is paramount in making
sure that investors are confident in continuing their
investments (Harrison & Wicks, 2013). A range
of indicators, such as corporate governance
characteristics, can be used to notify performance
improvements. This has motivated many accounting
and finance academics to pay more attention to
the need to identify which corporate governance
characteristics are the most effective for improving
firm performance.
The audit committee‘s effectiveness has become
increasingly important in the global corporate
governance agenda and in the emerging markets too.
The audit committee has a vital role in choosing,
managing, and directing the work of all
the companies‘ auditors, which is essential in
revising and reporting financial data (Shbeilat, 2018).
Accordingly, the audit committee has an advisory
function and enhances investors‘ expectations of
receiving more reliable financial reports. Financial
reporting transparency allows investors to better
monitor management and improve investment
efficiency.
There have been well-known corporate scandals,
e.g., Enron and WorldCom, USA; Satyam, India; and
Chuo-Aoyama PricewaterhouseCoopers, Japan, who
have shredded investors‘ confidence within capital
markets and corporate management. Regulators and
professionals mostly agreed that such corporate
governance failures resulted from weak audit
committees, low corporate governance, and a lack
of responsibility (Baatwah, Ahmad, & Salleh, 2016;
Bajra & Cadez, 2018). More rigorous legislations
were enacted that mainly aims to attract and protect
investors and other stakeholders and enhance
company value. The US Sarbanes Oxley Act, and
other similar laws worldwide, including the 8th
European Company Law Directive, the Jordanian
Stock Exchange rules (2002), the Australian Stock
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council
(2003, 2007, 2010, and 2014), the Dutch Corporate
Governance Code (2016), the Capital Market Authority
of Saudi Arabia, the Securities and Commodities
Authority of the UAE (2018) and the Egyptian
Corporate Governance Law (2016), addressed
corporate governance failures by giving more power
to audit committees and by setting some criteria
in selecting these committee members.
In
Egypt,
corporate
governance
within
companies has been an emerging issue, especially
after the 2011 revolution. In 2003, the Egyptian
Institute of Directors (EIoD) developed guidelines

and rules for applying company corporate
governance in line with the laws that regulate
businesses in Egypt. Such guidelines and rules were
based on international best practices. Egypt‘s
Ministry of Investment and the General Authority for
Investment and Free Zones issued the first release of
the Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance (ECCG),
2005, written in Arabic. Such code was written for
the interest of all shareholders and investors and
was aimed at achieving the highest level of efficiency
and sustainability within companies. It directed all
listed companies to comply with governance and
disclosure requirements.
Later, the EIoD issued the Corporate Governance
Code, 2006, for publicly owned corporations, which
aimed at improving the controls and supervision
of the public sector.
In addition, in 2011, the Egyptian government
further adopted a new code of corporate governance
for listed companies and banks, which was in line
with international practises as well regional
(Cigna, Djuric, & Sigheartau, 2017). The Corporate
Governance Code recommendations are like
the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
(OECD, 2015), which are adopted by several
countries, including South Africa, Malaysia, and
the Philippines. However, they are not mandatory:
in other words, it is optional if companies comply
with them or not. Within the corporate governance
code, the ―comply or explain‖ approach is applied;
in case of non-compliance, companies should have
a valid reason as to why. Since the recommendations
are not mandatory, it seemed to lack application.
In 2014, only a limited number of large companies
provided a ―comply or explain‖ statement with their
annual report; moreover, they had weak audit
committees that lack the necessary independence
to make them effective. As a result, in 2016,
the Egyptian Financial Supervision Authority (EFSA)
issued another updated corporate governance
guideline, which was to be adopted by all listed
companies, including banks and financial intuitions.
It introduced a new requirement that the audit
committees should consist of a minimum of three
board of directors: two members should be
independent (meaning they work outside of
the corporation) and one member must have financial
or accounting experience (Cigna et al., 2017).
According to the literature, the audit committee
effectiveness and firm performance has been studied
in developed countries, as in the UK by AgyemangMintah and Schadewitz (2018), Masmoudi (2021) in
the Netherlands and in other developing countries
as in Saudi Arabia and the UAE by Alzeban (2020),
and in Jordan by Dakhlallh, Rashid, Wan Abdullah,
and Al Shehab (2020). As a matter of fact, to the best
of our knowledge, the Egyptian context has not been
explored yet. In the Egyptian literature, the impact of
the audit committee effectiveness studied for early
periods (2007–2010) by Soliman and Raghab (2014)
and up until 2012 by Amer, Ragab, and Shehata
(2014), which means before the issuance of the new
Egyptian audit committee requirement of 2016.
Accordingly, this study can be distinguished from
the other previous studies, in fact, it will contribute
to the literature by examining Egypt‘s new
requirement with regards to the audit committee,
and its performance impact within companies listed
in Egypt.
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Another objective of this study is to guide
the professional accountancy bodies and Egyptian
regulators if such new added requirement can
enhance the financial reporting quality and
investors‘ confidence that, in turn, reflected in good
financial performance within the listed companies,
which represent the economic asset and contributor
of the Egyptian government.
For achieving such objectives, some research
questions are raised and examined, within this
paper, to find out which of the audit committee
characteristics has a significant impact on
the financial performance, for the selected listed
non-financial companies in a three years‘ period
from 2016 to 2018. The study measures
the audit committee characteristics collectively
(the independent variable) in terms of audit
committee size, independence, experience, gender
diversity, and frequency of meetings. Return on
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are used
to measure the company‘s financial performance
(the dependent variables). Previous studies have
suggested the firm size, firm age, leverage ratio, and
industry type as variables used for controlling
the influence of the company characteristics on
the firm performance. This study used such
suggested control variables. The published annual
financial and board of directors (BOD) reports of
these EGX 30 selected listed companies for 2016,
2017, and 2018 are examined and used for
secondary data collection. The data collected is then
analyzed by panel data cross-section data analysis
and correlation analysis. Panel data cross-section
data analysis is used to examine changes in
the variables over the three years and differences in
variables between selected companies.
The findings reveal that the audit committee
size is positively significant with ROA only and audit
committee members‘ financial experience is positively
significant with ROE only. The other audit
committee characteristics (independence, frequency
of meetings, and gender diversity) have no
significant relationship with ROA and ROE.
The remainder of this paper starts by presenting
an overview of previous studies in the literature,
the audit committee and corporate governance
in Egypt, and hypotheses development in Section 2.
The data collection and research methodology are
described in Section 3 and then data analysis and
the results are illustrated in Section 4. Finally, our
findings are summarized and concluded in Section 5.

2. LITERATURE
DEVELOPMENT

REVIEW

AND

(Deegan & Unerman, 2008). Agency problems may
occur when there is a separation between the owner
and management. A conflict of interests may arise
between management and principal, and asymmetric
information also may be present. These agency
problems subsequently lead to agency costs, which
become additional costs for companies in operating
their businesses and can affect firm performance.
Modern corporate governance deals with agency
problems and information asymmetry by controlling
and directing the relationship between managers
and the company‘s auditors, board directors, and
owners (Shbeilat, 2018). A good mechanism to achieve
this is having an independent audit committee,
which is responsible for monitoring all such
relationships, their communications and properly
applying the accounting and auditing standards
(Shbeilat & Harasees, 2018).
In the literature, the agency theory was
criticized for providing short-term perspective of
the firm purpose. As an alternative to the agency
theory, the stakeholder theory suggested that
shareholders are merely one of many stakeholders
in a company. The company‘s real success lies in
satisfying all its stakeholders, including stockholders,
creditors,
customers,
employees,
suppliers,
competitors, and not just only the stockholders.
Accordingly, the audit committee should work on
serving and protecting the interest of all those
stakeholders.
In
contrast
to
the
agency
theory,
the stewardship theory believes that agents are
egocentric and unorthodox. This theory assumes
that firm performance can be improved if
the executives and insiders have more control and
given more faith in managing the company (Ntim,
2009). Consequently, if most of the audit committee
are executive directors, this will increase efficiency
and have a better result than having most
independent directors from outside the business
(Al Mamun, Yasser, & Rahman, 2013). This is
thought to increase efficiency because the executive
and inside directors are more knowledgeable and
familiar because they have had more experience
within the company (Ntim, 2009). In this way,
the steward can unify the different interests of
the stakeholders and protect the long-term interest
of the principal (Hernandez, 2012). Here, managers
are self-motivated from the intrinsic rewards they
can get from performing their own duties, and not
extrinsic rewards, as assumed by the agency theory.
According to this theory, insiders are more suited
to be members of the audit committee than outsiders.
The resource dependence theory studies
how the external resources and environment
of an organization can affect its behaviour.
Accordingly, the audit committee advises and makes
recommendations to the board of directors, in order
to provide valuable resources to the firms.
The board often delegates these responsibilities to
its audit committee, but this delegation does not
excuse the board of its obligations and accountability
to shareholders and other stakeholders.
Nowadays, as per the mentioned theories, one
key focus of legislation and regulatory bodies is to
enhance the efficiency of corporate governance by
improving the audit committee roles and duties.
The 8th European Company Law Directive made
a requirement, to strengthen the audit committee

HYPOTHESES

Over the last decade, there has been an uprise
in literature with regards to corporate governance
in accounting and auditing. As well as it being
discussed from different perspectives, it has been
researched and studied through the application of
different theoretical frameworks: the agency theory
(Ross, 1973; Mitnick, 1975), the stakeholder theory
(Freeman, 1984), the stewardship theory (Donaldson
& Davis, 1991) and the resource theory (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978).
The agency theory emphasises the relationship
between the principal (stockholder) and the agent
(management). The agency theory stated that a wellfunctioning firm is able to reduce agency costs
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role, that there must be a minimum of one member
within the audit committee that is an expert in
finance. In fact, these new reforms were initiated by
developed countries and adopted by most emerging
countries like Egypt in 2016. This is because
the audit committee has a vital role in a business‘
financial reporting and audit (Beasley, Carcello,
Hermanson, & Neal, 2009; Baatwah et al., 2016;
Masmoudi, 2021). It is primarily responsible for
ensuring that businesses are reliable within their
accounting process, compliant with legal and ethical
standards, and are able to maintain their fraud
controls (Turley & Zaman, 2004).
With regards to the relation between corporate
performance and the audit committee, previous
research has found varied results. Collier (1993),
Conyon (1994), Wild (1994), Karamanou and Vafeas
(2005), and Carcello, Hermanson, and Ye (2011)
found that when companies have an effective audit
committee, their financial performance is significantly
increased, as an effective financial audit committee
can analyse financial information in-depth and
ensure it is free from errors, thus enhancing
the quality of all financial disclosure. Zha (2006),
DeFond, Hann, and Xuesong (2005), McKnight,
Milonas, Travlos, and Weir (2009), Al-Matari, Al-Swidi,
Fadzil, and Al-Matari (2012), Aldamen, Duncan,
Kelly, McNamara, and Nagel (2012), Munisi and
Randøy (2013), Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014),
Gani, Wijeweera, and Eddie (2017) in Australia,
Zábojníková (2016) in the UK, Maina and Oluoch
(2018) in Kenia, Shabana (2018), Azar et al. (2018),
Bajra and Cadez (2018) in EU, Talpur, Lizam, and
Zabri (2018) in Malaysia, and Masmoudi (2021) in
the Netherlands reported a significantly positive
relationship between the audit committee and
corporate performance. They suggested for future
research a deep examination of better measures of
governance and audit committee characteristics.
In contrast to the studies mentioned above,
some other studies previously done found that
having an audit committee can have no effect on
a business. Turley and Zaman (2004), Bozec (2005),
Bradbury, Mak, and Tan (2006), Reddy, Locke, and
Scrimgeour (2011), and Jati Wibawaningsih and
Primta Surbakti (2020) in Indonesia found that good
governance has nothing to do with the audit
committee features, such as being a finance expert
and independent of the company. Other researchers
(DeZoort, 1997; Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2002; Guy &
Zeff, 2002) have argued that many members of
the audit committee lack critical characteristics,
such as independence and experience, and this has
had no effect on company performance.
However, given the mixed empirical evidence
and results, this research attempts to examine
whether the audit committees in Egyptian listed
corporations do have a positive impact on its
financial performance or not.
Based
on
all
the
above
literature,
the effectiveness of the audit committee can be
examined and measured through its members‘
actions, behaviours, processes, and personality
traits (Gendron & Bédard, 2006). Magrane and
Malthus (2010) find that the effectiveness of audit
committees should be ―interpreted cautiously‖.
This is because the definition of effectiveness is
a broad spectrum and extremely hard to measure
(Spira, 2006; Gendron, Bédard, & Gosselin, 2004).
To achieve the study‘s objective, each attribute of
the audit committee will be investigated as follows.

2.1. Audit committee size
The Egyptian corporate governance codes require
there should be at least three non-executive
members of the board of directors within the audit
committee. In accordance with the agency theory,
large audit committees tend to be less focused and
participate less than smaller size ones. Thus,
the monitoring process of these large committees
will be eliminated and lower the firm performance
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Maina & Oluoch, 2018).
Aldamen et al. (2012) in Australia, and Hamdan,
Sarea, and Reyad (2013) in Amman found that
smaller audit committees that contain qualified
members with finance and accounting experience
are more likely to improve the firm performance
in the market.
In contrast, proponents of resource dependency
theory give emphasis to the effect of a larger audit
committee. Their view is that large committees can
appoint more members with different knowledge
and experience that help in improving accurate
accounting (Choi, Jeon, & Park, 2004). Large audit
committees will have more meetings and result in
more effective supervision and recommendations
(Raghunandan, Rama, & Read, 2001). Reddy, Locke,
and Scrimgeour (2010), Al-Mamun, Yasser, Rahman,
Wickramasinghe, and Nathan (2014), and Rezaei and
Abbasi (2015) also found that the audit committee
size positively affects the firm performance.
On the other hand, Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, and
Fadzil (2014), and Oradi, Lari Dashtbayaz, and
Salari Forg (2017) found that company performance
is not down to the size of the audit committee.
Due to such contrasting results and to test
such relationship, the first hypothesis can be
expressed in this way:
H1: Profitability has a direct significant
relationship with the size of the audit committee.
H1a: ROA has a direct significant relationship
with the size of the audit committee.
H1b: ROE has a direct significant relationship
with the size of the audit committee.

2.2. Independence of the audit committee
ECCG required that there should be at least three
non-executive directors within the audit committee
and that their supervisory functions must be as
independent individuals because this may reduce
conflicts of interest between managers and
shareholders. This result can be expected because
the committee‘s independence ensures the monitoring
role of the audit committee is enhanced.
If the audit committee is independent of
the company, it ensures quality audits and enhances
the financial statement users‘ trust in the financial
reporting process. Some researchers have found,
among the listed companies, that there is a positive
significant relationship between the number of
independent members and corporate financial
performance, as the financial reporting quality is
improved in such companies (e.g., Carcello &
Neal, 2003; Felo, Krishnamurthy, & Solieri, 2003;
Van der Zahn & Tower, 2004; Jamil & Nelson, 2011).
If the audit committee is independent, then
fraudulent activity within businesses will be
controlled and decreased (Bronson, Carcello,
Hollingsworth, & Neal, 2009; O‘Connell & Cramer,
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2010; Yunos, Ahmad, & Sulaiman, 2014; Li, Lu,
Mittoo, & Zhang, 2015; Shorvarzi, Khalili,
Soleimani, & Forotan, 2015). Independent members
of the committee will be unbiased when investigating
all financial statements that affect a firm‘s financial
performance (Saibaba, 2013). On the other side of
the
argument,
Abdul Rahman
and
Haneem
Mohamed Ali (2006), Wang, Lu, and Lin (2012), and
Khosa (2017) found that audit committee
independence has a negative effect on a company‘s
financial performance.
Allowing outsiders to be members of the audit
committees is a debateable point here. Generally, it
is believed that the audit committee members‘ roles
are to recommend specific actions for improvement
to the board and then to follow up on these actions.
The aim is for them to enhance the board‘s
company‘s objectives. Accordingly, audit committee
members will be able to perform their duties more
efficiently when they have a comprehensive
understanding of the company‘s business. However,
outsiders may lack the full understanding needed
to be able to abide by the same duties of loyalty,
care, and objectives needed by board members.
Since the audit committee is permitted to ask for
external advice within specific matters, there is
no need to replace the committee members with
external advisors (Cigna et al., 2017). Fuzi, Halim,
and Julizaerma (2016) found a varied opinion about
the relationship between the number of independent
members and firm performance. As the results of
such relationship are still debatable, the second
hypothesis can be as follows:
H2: Audit committee members’ independence
and profitability have a direct significant relationship.
H2a: Audit committee members’ independence
and ROA have a direct significant relationship.
H2b: Audit committee members’ independence
and ROE have a direct significant relationship.

and monitoring financial reporting practices.
This result is parallel to the Guidance on Audit
Committees
(FRC,
2016).
Improvements
in
the financial literacy of audit committee members
are associated with stronger stock returns (Coates,
Marais, & Weil, 2007). Hermanson, Krishnan, and
Ye (2009) mentioned that shareholders‘ votes for
auditors are based on the audit committees‘
expertise within finance. DeFond et al. (2005) and
Engel et al. (2010) found that audit committees that
contain
qualified
members
receive
higher
compensation in comparison to other board
directors who are part of such committee.
Aldamen et al. (2012) in Australia, Hamdan
et al. (2013) in Amman, Baatwah et al. (2016) in
Oman, and Farber, Huang, and Mauldin (2018)
in the USA provided evidence that audit committees
that contain experts in finance and accounting
indeed enhances firms‘ information environment,
financial reporting quality, and analysts‘ forecast
properties.
Thus,
increasing
the
investors‘
confidence, which results in higher trading volume
and lower liquidity risk. This improves the firm‘s
financial performance. In Kenya, Maina and Oluoch
(2018) found that most of the manufacturing firms
had employed audit committee members highly
experienced in financial management to ensure that
they execute their duties as required.
However, this literature focused on data from
the USA and other countries where the legal system
may be extremely strict and different. Therefore,
extending this literature to other settings, such as
the Egyptian one, would have increased the reliability
of these findings, especially in 2016 when
the regulatory bodies started to pay greater
attention to the features of an audit committee and
recommended that audit committees must have at
least one member who is an expert within finance.
Therefore, it is expected that an audit
committee that has financial experts as its members
can provide good recommendations and improve
the company‘s financial status. Thus, the third
hypothesis is as follows:
H3: Qualified
audit
committee
members
significantly influence profitability.
H3a: Qualified audit committee members
significantly influence ROA.
H3b: Qualified audit committee members
significantly influence ROE.

2.3. Audit committee’s experience
One significant input of audit committee
effectiveness is the audit committee‘s financial
expertise. It is presumed that if the committee‘s
non-executive board members are completely
qualified to make financial decisions, they are
expected to have the ability to find a resolution for
the business‘ financial issues. In 2003, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) gave a definition of
the audit committee members who have financial
expertise in which it stated that ―an accounting
expert is any person who is trained and has
the required accounting and auditing expertise, or
have special expertise other than accounting like
specialization in banking and investment and
specialization in financial analysis‖ (SEC, 2003).
Recent survey research found that audit
committee chairs are held by directors who are more
likely to be accounting experts (e.g., Beasley et al.,
2009; Salleh & Stewart, 2012; Engel, Hayes, & Wang,
2010; Schmidt & Wilkins, 2013; Tanyi & Smith, 2015)
and provided empirical evidence on how financial
expertise can assist in financial reporting quality.
On the other hand, only one study (Abernathy,
Beyer, Masli, & Stefaniak, 2014) failed to find such
a significant association.
Choi et al. (2004) found that audit committees
that are larger and include more members with
varied expertise are more effective in performing

2.4. Gender diversity
There has been a global debate about policies that
mandate women to join the board. Within the recent
period, more people have researched the impact of
female board members, and their impact on firm
performance. However, the evidence remains
questionable (Abdelzaher & Abdelzaher, 2019).
In Egypt, the women‘s role in the society is
a sophisticated component of the nation‘s culture
and beliefs. In Egyptian society, gender has
a significant social and economic influence.
The Egyptian corporate governance laws and
regulations are silent on the board‘s gender
diversity. Only four out of the ten largest listed
companies in Egypt disclosed their board
composition, and they appear to have women as part
of their board members, which is on average about
15.33%. For all the ten companies, the average
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female representation percentage in their boards
is 6.13% (Cigna et al., 2017). However, the Egyptian
Stock Exchange has started to pay more attention to
the female employment of the board and has
now included the gender diversity issue within
the broader topic of sustainability, the promotion of
which is now a part of the stock exchange‘s strategy.
In Egypt, Abdelzaher and Abdelzaher (2019)
investigated 114 Egyptian firms and the effect of
firm performance with regards to having female
board members. They found that there was
a positive impact on the firm value (ROE) due to
female participation. In the UK, Agyemang-Mintah
and Schadewitz (2019) show that the presence of
females on boards indeed has a positive outcome
in terms of firm value.
Many executives stated that having a female
member on the board changed board behaviour,
which impacted their monitoring role (Sonnabend,
2015). Females have monitoring skills that are
superior to their male counterparts, which can cause
boards to be more accountable (Triana, Miller, &
Trzebiatowski, 2014). Females also have a unique
management style that shapes the board‘s dynamics
and enhances its negotiations and communication
style. This leads to a more participative environment
and accordingly, enhances a positive firm value
(Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007; Carter,
D‘Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Dargnies, 2012;
Barbulescu & Bidwell, 2013). Some studies suggest
that greater females have stricter compliance and
ethical values: therefore, they indirectly increase
firm value.
On the contrary, Isidro and Sobral (2015) found
no evidence to back up the statement that female
participation on the board directly affects a firm‘s
value. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) found that due to
employing female board members in Norwegian
firms, their firm performance decreased because
such females had a lack of experience (Kogut,
Colomer, & Belinky, 2014). Due to these mixed
results, the fourth hypothesis will be as follows:
H4: Gender diversity on the audit committee has
a significant impact on profitability.
H4a: Gender diversity on the audit committee
has a significant impact on ROA.
H4b: Gender diversity on the audit committee
has a significant impact on ROE.

and Zhou (2007) argue that audit committees may
only increase the number of meetings when there
are problems in control. DeZoort, Hermanson,
Archambeault, and Reed (2002) and Al-Mamun et al.
(2014) found that regular meetings of audit
committees could help reduce agency problems and
information asymmetry of a firm because there
will be consistent communication to investors,
which will safeguard their interests. Maina and
Oluoch (2018) found that such regular audit
committee meetings helped in ensuring that
the organizational finance department consistently
complies with accounting guidelines and other
accounting actions.
On the other hand, Abdul Rahman and Haneem
Mohamed Ali (2006), Stewart and Munro (2007), and
Mohd Saleh, Mohd Iskandar, and Mohid Rahmat
(2007) provided evidence that lessening audit
committee meetings reduces additional expenses
accumulated from the meeting. This, in turn, can
improve the firm‘s financial performance. Such
mixed results in terms of this subject should be
tested, so the fifth hypothesis will be as follows:
H5: The frequency of audit committee meetings
significantly influences profitability
H5a: The frequency of audit committee meetings
significantly influences ROA.
H5b: The frequency of audit committee meetings
significantly influences ROE.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research involves both inductive and deductive
reasoning processes. The theoretical principles and
literature have been deducted through using library
research, articles, and internet sources. The needed
information for testing the research hypotheses
was collected inductively. The quantitative research
method and panel design are used in this study as
other studies (e.g., Dakhlallh et al., 2020; Puni &
Anlesinya, 2020). Panel design is the ―pooling of
observations on a cross-section of units over several
time periods and provides results that are simply
not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure timeseries studies (Baltagi, 2005). In this study, a number
of variables are investigated for 25 companies over
3 consecutive years to test the research hypotheses.
Other studies use ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression (Alzeban, 2020; Masmoudi, 2021) and
multiple regression model (Ado, Rashid, Mustapha, &
Ademola, 2020) in testing the variables for different
sample sizes.

2.5. Frequency of meetings
The audit committee chairman consults with
the company‘s secretary in deciding on the timing
and frequency of its meetings. The more effective
monitoring and controlling bodies are those who
meet frequently. In the UK, audit committees must
congregate no less than three times annually, and
this was recommended by the Financial Reporting
Council‘s Guide on Audit Committees. The Egyptian
Corporate Governance Code also requires that
the audit committee should meet every quarter, and
it should follow specific agenda.
Several studies have investigated whether
the frequency of audit committee meetings affects
firm performance, and they have revealed mixed
results. Khanchel (2007) and Kyereboah-Coleman
(2008) found that the more often an audit committee
meets, the more successful a firm‘s performance is.
Abbott, Parker, and Peters (2004) and Zhang, Zhou,

3.1. Data collection
The time period starting from 2016 till 2018 is
selected for this study because, in 2016,
the Egyptian listed firms, most likely, have started
applying the recommendations of the Egyptian
Stock Exchange updating listing rules regarding
the composition of the audit committee. These
recently updated rules added some requirements for
including members with accounting or financial
experience. Each audit committee should also have
as a minimum three non-executive board members,
two of whom are independent and should meet on
a quarterly basis.
The selected sample is based on the EGX 30,
the 30 most active companies listed in the Egyptian
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stock market. These companies are perfectly
reflecting the Egyptian market. The regulatory
bodies set some rules and standards for listed firms
in operating their business activities. The firms, to
be listed, should abide by such rules, prepare and
publish their financial information in compliance
with
the
Egyptian
Accounting
Standards.
The studied sample covers different sectors including
entertainment
and
tourism,
communication,
building material and construction, manufacturing
goods and services, automobiles, food and beverage,
housing and real estate, and information technology.
The banks and investment and financial institutions
sector is omitted from the sample as this one has
different governance issues.
The selected companies are as follows:
1) Palm Hills Developments Company SAE;
2) El Sewedy Electric Co SAE;
3) GB Auto SAE;
4) Talaat Mostafa Group Holding Co SAE;
5) Alexandria Mineral Oils Co SAE;
6) Oriental Weavers Carpet Co SAE;
7) Egyptian Resorts Co SAE;
8) Heliopolis Company for Housing and
Development SAE;

SAE;

9) Madinet Nasr for Housing and Development

10) Egyptian Iron and Steel Co SAE;
11) Global Telecom Holding SAE;
12) Telecom Egypt Co SAE;
13) Emaar Misr for Development SAE;
14) Juhayna Food Industries SAE;
15) Cairo for Investment and Real Estate
Development SAE;
16) CI Capital Holding Company SAE;
17) Orascom Investment Holding SAE;
18) Egyptian Chemical Industries SAE;
19) Eastern Company SAE;
20) Arabia Cotton Ginning Co SAE;
21) Ezz Steel Co SAE;
22) Egypt Kuwait Holding Co SAE;
23) Orascom Development Egypt SAE;
24) Sixth
of
October
Development
and
Investment Co SAE;
25) Arabia Investments Holding SAE.
Therefore,
the
final
sample
includes
75 observations (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson,
2013). Table 1 summarises the final sample size.

Table 1. The final sample
Description
Initial sample (3 years)
Less: Financial institutions (4 financial intuitions and 1 bank)
Final size

Number of observations
90
15
75

There are three types of data are collected as
follows:
● Audit committee’s data: the data required
for identifying the audit committee‘s characteristics
are collected using the ―BOD reports‖ of these
selected companies for the period of 2016–2018.
These BOD reports were obtained from an Egyptian
company for information dissemination (EGID).
The BOD reports include the audit committee
number of members, their role and responsibilities,
the
committee
composition,
its
member‘s
independence, qualifications, experienced members,
and the number of meetings held annually.
Sometimes the number of audit committee members
differed throughout the year as they are usually
changed or replaced by the year-end. Accordingly,
the number of members at year-end is only
considered.
● Firm performance data: ROE and ROA
calculations require data collected from Thompson
Reuters Datastream as well as the published
financial statements for the period of 2016–2018.
● Control variables data: the total assets of
the company data is needed to measure the firm
size. Firm leverage is calculated using the debt-toequity ratio. These figures are extracted from
the published financial statements. The industry
type is mentioned in the BOD reports.

Saat, 2015) used different firm performance
measurements such as ROA, ROE, Tobin‘s Q,
dividend payable and stock price (Zabri, Ahmad, &
Wah, 2016) or market share (Alabdullah, 2018). With
no agreement on the best performance measurement
(Ntim & Osei, 2011), the present study uses ROA, as
it is the most accepted profitability measurement
used by regulators (Kallamu & Saat, 2015), and it
reflects the company‘s management efficiency in
using all its assets to generate profits (Sufian &
Habibullah, 2010). ROE is also a good measure as it
reflects the management efficiency and ability in
using the company‘s investments to improve
earnings growth.
Prior studies use many
measures of
the performance of the firm, such as ROA, ROE
(Moh‘d Al-Tamimi & Obeidat, 2013), or used Tobin‘s Q
as a measure of the dependent variable to evaluate
the company‘s performance.

3.2.2. Independent and control variables
The size of the audit committee, their gender, how
often they meet, along with them being independent
of the company and having expertise, all are
independent variables. This study measures the audit
committee size variable as the total number of
committee members at the end of the year
(Abbott et al., 2004; Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, & Fadzil,
2013; Alqatamin, 2018). The audit committee
independence
variable
is measured
by
the
percentage of independent members from the total
number of members (Kallamu & Saat, 2015). The
committee experience variable is measured as the
percentage of members who have accounting or
finance experience (Mangena & Pike, 2005; Rochmah
Ika & Mohd Ghazali, 2012). The gender diversity

3.2. Measurement of variables

3.2.1. Dependent variable
Firm performance is measured, in this study, using
ROE and ROA. Previous researchers (Kim & Rasiah,
2010; Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2013; San Ong & Gan,
2013; Moh‘d Al-Tamimi & Obeidat, 2013; Kallamu &
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an effect on firm performance, firm age is used as
one of the control variables in this study.
As per the literature, corporate governance
can be influenced by the firm size. Large companies
are less effective than the smaller ones because of
their higher agency issues (Patro, Lehn, & Zhao, 2003).
Other researchers found that big firms have good
internal controls, and better information systems,
that improve the quality of reporting and,
in turn, the firm performance (Zábojníková, 2016).
The research results are mixed regarding
the influence of the firm size in the corporate
governance context.

variable is measured as the percentage of female
members out of the total audit committee members
(Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Frias‐Aceituno,
Rodriguez‐Ariza,
&
Garcia‐Sanchez,
2013).
The frequency of meetings variable is measured by
the number of meetings held during the year
as mentioned in the BOD reports (Rochmah Ika &
Mohd Ghazali, 2012).
Previous studies (Al-Matari et al, 2014; Kallamu
& Saat, 2015; Bansal & Sharma, 2016; Masmoudi,
2021) have suggested the firm size, firm age, and
leverage ratio as variables used for controlling the
influence of the company characteristics on the firm
performance. This study used such suggested
control variables.
Firm leverage is measured, here, by the total
debt to total equity ratio. Many authors, as Olokoyo
(2013), Gondrige, Clemente, and Espejo (2012), Fauzi
and Locke (2012), Lama (2012), found that high firm
leverage can lead to lower ROA. If the higher levels
of debt the firm decreases its agency costs, then its
capital structure will have a significant relationship
with its financial performance (Jensen, 1986).
Firm age represents the time passed since
the firm‘s incorporation. The relationship between
firm age and firm performance is ambiguous.
There is a view that mature firm performance is
better than that of newly established ones due to
the goodwill they have gained over time (Mousa &
Desoky, 2012). Others believe that due to
the rigidness and the satisfaction of old firms, they
do not easily adopt new technologies and changes
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Thus, to control such

3.2.3. Empirical model
The empirical model used here to examine
the relation between the characteristics of the audit
committee and the company performance is as
follows. The definitions and measurements of all
variables are shown in Table 2.

(1)

where PERFORM is a measure of firm performance
taken as ROA and ROE for firm i at time t, and
is
the error term.

Table 2. Variables definitions and measurements
Variables

Definition

Measurement
Dependent variables

ROE

Return on equity

Measured as a percentage of net income to common equity.

ROA

Return on assets

Measured as a percentage of net income to total assets.

ACMSIZE
ACINDE
ACEXP
ACMEET
ACFEMA

FSIZE
FAGE

Independent variables
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the audit committee
Audit committee size
consists of at least 3 members, 0 otherwise.
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if all audit committee
Audit committee independence
members are independent, 0 otherwise.
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is one or more
Audit committee financial expertise
experts and 0 if none.
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of meetings is
Audit committee meeting frequency
more than 4 times and 0 if none.
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is one or more female
Gender diversity
and 0 if no female member.
Control variables
The total assets owned by the firm measured as the natural logarithm of
Firm size
total assets.
Firm age
Measured as the number of years since its incorporation in its logarithm.

FLEVER

Firm leverage

INDTYP

Industry type

Measured as a percentage of total debt to total equity.
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the company an industrial
firm and 0 if it is a service company.

According to Table 3, the research variables
in terms of ROE, ROA, firm age, firm size, and firm
leverage are normally distributed as the probability
associated with their JB test is significantly greater
than (0.05).

4. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
4.1. Jarque-Bera test
For measuring the normal distribution of all
research panel data, in terms of dependent and
independent variables, Jarque-Bera (JB) normality
test is used in this research.
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Table 3. Descriptive analysis
ROE
0.165897
0.132109
0.519893
-0.220032
0.152536
0.221281
3.059072
0.622973
0.732358
75

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability
Observations

ROA
0.057887
0.056434
0.204172
-0.091815
0.061285
-0.014534
2.804249
0.122386
0.940642
75

FSIZE
23.24604
23.27903
25.33608
20.43501
1.262128
-0.252740
2.208876
2.754340
0.252292
75

The dependent variables here are the ROE and
the ROA used to measure the company‘s
performance. From Table 3 results, it is shown that
the measured ROA and ROE of the selected
companies are financially on average during
the investigated three-year period (2016–2018).
The mean value is used here to identify the high and
low levels of ROA and ROE. The ROA minimum value
is found to be -9.18% and the maximum is 20.4%,
which indicates a significant range, while the 5.7%
ROA mean value shows a generally low ROA ratio
across these companies. For the other dependent
variable, ROE, the minimum value is -22% and
the maximum is 51.9%, which also indicates
a considerable range, and its 16.5% mean value
shows a high ROE ratio generally across the Egyptian
companies. These figures are consistent with
the findings of Amer et al. (2014) in Egypt and
Rahman, Meah, and Chaudhory (2019) in Bangladesh.
Regarding the control variables, the firm size
variable has a range, minimum from 20.43 to 25.33
maximum, with a standard deviation (SD) of 1.26.
The firm leverage variable has a 0.66 mean value and
ranges from a minimum of 0.18 to 1.13 maximum.
For the firm age, it is shown that its mean value is
20 years; minimum 2 years and maximum value
39 years. The industry type statistics will be shown
in the next table (Table 4), as it is measured
as a dummy variable that takes 0 if the company
is working in the service sector or 1 if in
the industrial sector.
The Egyptian Corporate Governance Code
requires that audit committees should include
a minimum of three non-executive board members,
two of whom are independent and one of them

FAGE
20.01200
20.00000
39.00000
2.000000
8.509467
0.120775
2.746196
0.383635
0.825458
75

FLEVER
0.659600
0.660000
1.130000
0.180000
0.184004
-0.307306
3.107752
1.216744
0.544236
75

should have accounting or financial experience.
The audit committee should also meet at least every
quarter. Table 4 shows to what extent the selected
Egyptian companies abide by such requirement
through presenting some statistics for all the audit
committee
characteristics
which
represent
the research independent variables as follows:
● Audit committee size: 72% of the companies
included in this study abide by the Egyptian
Corporate Governance Code and maintain not less
than three members on their audit committee.
● Audit committee experience: the statistics
show 69% of these companies have not less than
one member having accounting or financial
experience in the audit committee.
● Independence of audit committee members:
77% of the companies have an audit committee
including three or more independent members.
● Number of meetings: 69% of the selected
companies have audit committees that meet every
quarter (i.e., four times) as required by the ECCG and
31% meet five or more times.
● Gender diversity: 81.3% of the sample have
no female members in their audit committee. Only
18.7% of the companies have one female in their
committee. This low percentage can be expected in
Egypt as the Egyptian Corporate Governance Law
and codes are silent on women‘s participation at
the audit committee.
● Industry type (as a control variable):
it is noticed that 52% of the sample are from
the manufacturing sector and 48% are in the service
sector as telecommunication and real estate and
development.

Table 4. Frequency table for the independent variables and industry type
Variables
ADUIT_COMMITTEE SIZE
AUD_EXPERIENCE
F_MEETING
GENDER_DIVERSITY
IND_TYPE
INDEPEND_AUDIT

0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

Dummy variable
(less than 3 members)
(equal or more than 3 members)
(no financial experts)
(one financial expert)
(less than or equal 4)
(greater than 4)
(male)
(female)
(service)
(manufacturing)
(less than 3)
(equal to or more than 3)

Frequency
21.0
54.0
23.0
52.0
52
23
61
14
36
39
17
58

Percent
28.0
72.0
30.7
69.3
69.3
30.7
81.3
18.7
48.0
52.0
22.7
77.3

covariance value between two time periods does not
depend on the actual time, but rather depends only
on the distance between the two time periods.
The covariance is computed for ROE, firm age, firm
size, and firm leverage in Table 5, and for ROA, firm
age, firm size, and firm leverage in Table 6.

4.2. Group unit root test
Time series are stationary if they do not have a trend
or seasonal effects. The stationary in a time series
is studied by using the unit root test. The reason is
to ensure that the mean and variance are constant
and do not change over time, and also that
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Table 5. Group unit root test for ROE, firm size, firm age, and firm leverage
Method

Statistic
Prob.***
Cross-sections
Obs.
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin-Lin-Chu*
-6.08383
0.0000
4
296
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im-Pesaran-Shin**
-6.19990
0.0000
4
296
ADF — Fisher Chi-square
53.8913
0.0000
4
296
PP — Fisher Chi-square
51.8877
0.0000
4
296‖
Notes: * Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002). ** Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003). *** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.

Table 6. Group unit root test for ROA, firm size, firm age, and firm leverage
Method

Statistic
Prob.***
Cross-sections
Obs.
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin-Lin-Chu*
-6.51556
0.0000
4
296
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im-Pesaran-Shin**
-6.60746
0.0000
4
296
ADF — Fisher Chi-square
58.8026
0.0000
4
296
PP — Fisher Chi-square
55.9277
0.0000
4
296
Notes: * Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002). ** Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003). *** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.

Table 5 results revealed the stationary of
the time series of the ROE, firm age, firm size, and
firm leverage at level 1 ~ (0) based on the constant
level, due to the following criteria: Levin-Lin-Chu,
Im-Pesaran-Shin, PP, ADF, at a significance level less
than (0.05).
Table 6 also shows the stationary of the time
series of the ROA, firm age, firm size, and firm
leverage at level 1 ~ (0) based on the constant level,
due to the following criteria: Levin-Lin-Chu,
Im-Pesaran-Shin, PP, ADF, at a significance level less
than (0.05).

4.3. Cointegrating equation model
Engle-Granger cointegration test indicates that
the residual of the cointegrating regression should
be stationary if the variables are cointegrated.
Accordingly, it is used here to measure if there are
long-run
equilibrium
relationships
between
the nonstationary time series variables in terms of
ROE, firm age, firm size, and firm leverage in Table 7
and in terms of ROA, firm age, firm size, and firm
leverage in Table 8 as follows.

Table 7. Cointegration test for the dependent variables (ROE, firm size, firm age, and firm leverage)
Dependent variable
Tau-statistic
ROE
-5.227991
FSIZE
-4.351956
FAGE
-3.707804
FLEVER
-4.729325
Note: * MacKinnon (1996) p-values.

Prob.*
0.0039
0.0395
0.1509
0.0155

Z-statistic
-40.46061
-28.07737
-19.57881
-34.88274

Prob.*
0.0028
0.0543
0.2566
0.0116

Table 8. Cointegration test for the dependent variables (ROA, firm size, firm age, and firm leverage)
Dependent variable
Tau-statistic
ROA
-5.919591
FSIZE
-4.358363
FAGE
-3.892882
FLEVER
-4.394769
Note: * MacKinnon (1996) p-values.

Prob.*
0.0005
0.0389
0.1064
0.0357

From Table 7 and Table 8, it is found that there
are long-term equilibrium relationships between
the variables ROE, firm size, and firm leverage, and
ROA, firm size, and firm leverage, based on the Taustatistic and z-statistic, at a significance level less
than (0.05). In contrast, the firm age variable,
for both groups, is not co-integrated since
the significance level is more than (0.05).

Z-statistic
-48.04708
-28.25360
-21.61390
-30.95225

Prob.*
0.0003
0.0524
0.1845
0.0292

are checked to find out if there is high multicollinearity among variables or not. The Chi-square
test is commonly used for testing relationships on
categorical variables as the independent variables
here and the industry type, are measured as dummy
variables (0 or 1). Table 9a presents the Pearson
correlations of the control variables (firm age, size,
and leverage) with the ROA, and Table 9b presents
the Chi-square tests of the independent variables
(audit committee characteristics) and industry type
with the ROA. Table 10a presents the Pearson
correlations of the control variables with the ROE,
and Table 10b presents the Chi-square tests of
the independent
variables
(audit
committee
characteristics) and industry type with the ROE.

4.4. Correlation analysis
This study uses the Chi-square test and the Pearson
correlation to measure the correlations between
the audit committee characteristics and firm
performance variables. The correlation coefficients
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Table 9a. Pearson correlation matrix to measure a significant linear relationship between the control
variables and ROA
Variables
ROA
ROA
1
FSIZE
-0.205501
FAGE
0.228569*
FLEVER
-0.288959*
Note: * Significant at a level less than (0.05).

FSIZE
1
-0.257966
0.215336

FAGE

1
-0.066843

FLEVER

1

Table 9b. Chi-square test to measure the significant relationships between the independent variables
and ROA
Pearson Chi-square
ACMSIZE
ACINDE
ACEXP
ACFEMA
ACMEET_1
INDTYP
Note: * Significant at a level less than (0.1).

Value
18.404
1.032
0.232
0.182
0.000
5.966

D.F.
1
1
1
1
1
1

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
0.001***
0.310
0.630
0.669
0.984
0.015*

Table 10a. Pearson correlation matrix to measure a significant linear relationship between the control
variables and ROE
Variables
ROE
ROE
1
FSIZE
-0.017551
FAGE
0.016859
FLEVER
0.212592*
Note: * Significant at a level less than (0.05).

FSIZE
1
-0.257966
0.215336

FAGE

1
-0.066843

FLEVER

1

Table 10b. Chi-square test to measure the significant relationships between the independent variables
and ROE
Pearson Chi-square
ACMSIZE
ACINDE
ACEXP
ACFEMA
ACMEET_1
INDTYP
Note: * Significant at a level less than (0.1).

Value
1.959
1.221
9.839
0.16
0.63
3.316

D.F.
1
1
1
1
1
1

According to Tables 9a and 10a correlation
coefficients, no high correlation is found among
the variables. From the Pearson correlation matrix,
the highest coefficient is 0.28 (i.e., less than 80%)
between FLEVER and ROA. Thus, there is
no multicollinearity problem that can affect
the interpretation of regression coefficients of
the independent variables in this model (Murtagh &
Heck, 2012).
To test the research hypotheses, the correlation
results from Tables 9a and 9b (ROA) and 10a and
10b (ROE) can be used as follows:
1. There is a significant relationship between
audit committee size and ROA at a significant level
less than (0.01). This result is consistent with
the findings of Pearce and Zahra (1992), Reddy et al.
(2010), Jamil and Nelson (2011) in Malaysia,
Al-Mamun et al. (2014), Al-Matari et al. (2014)
in Oman, Rezaei and Abbasi (2015) and Talpur et al.
(2018) in Malaysia, and Alqatamin (2018) in Jordan.
The resource dependence theory, which suggests
that when the larger the audit committee, the larger
to effectiveness, also backs up this result. This is
because it will therefore have more resources to
assist company issues. This result can also be
supported by the statistical results previously shown
in Table 4 that 72% of the companies included in

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
0.162
0.269
0.002**
0.898
0.802
0.069*

this study follow the Egyptian Corporate Governance
Code and have not less than three audit committee
members. However, this finding is inconsistent with
Herdjiono and Sari (2017) in Indonesia who find that
the audit committee size does not affect the ROA
of the listed companies.
However, there is no relationship between audit
committee size and ROE at a significant level less
than (0.01). This is consistent with the findings of
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) in Malaysia and Singapore,
Aanu, Odianonsen, and Foyeke (2014) in Nigeria,
Al-Matari et al. (2014) in Oman, and Salehi,
Tahervafaei, and Tarighi (2018) in Iran that the audit
committee size may not affect the financial
performance (ROE) as in accordance with the agency
theory view that the larger auditing committee will
eliminate the monitoring process and lower the firm
performance. On the other hand, Zábojníková (2016)
in the UK and Bauer et al. (2009) find that the audit
committee size can positively influence the ROE.
Accordingly, the H1a can be accepted for
the ROA only and H1b rejected for ROE.
2. There is no relationship between the audit
committee independence and both ROA and ROE at
a significant level less (0.01). These findings are
matched with the findings of Al-Matari et al. (2012)
in Saudi Arabia, Leung, Richardson, and Jaggi (2014),
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Bansal and Sharma (2016) in India, Zábojníková
(2016) in the UK, and Mohammed (2018) that audit
committee independence does not affect the firm
performance. It supports the stewardship theory
assumptions that the independent directors may be
unfamiliar with the firm and not have more
knowledge about its current condition and are not
participating effectively in the daily decision-making
process of the organization. This creates problems
in the implementation of their plans and decisions
that may negatively affect the firm profitability.
Therefore, if the size of the independent directors
increases, this might mislead the decision-making
process.
On the other hand, Chan and Li (2008), Jamil
and Nelson (2011) in Malaysia, Aanu et al. (2014)
in Nigeria, Kallamu and Saat (2015), Salehi et al.
(2018) in Iran, and Alqatamin (2018) in Jordan, find
a significant relationship between independence and
ROA and Yasser, Entebang, and Mansor (2011) find
a relation between independence and ROE that
supports the agency theory perspective. In addition,
the Egyptian regulators believe that the greater
degree of the audit committee independence can
reduce the frauds in the financial statement
reporting and improve the firm performance.
Since it is found that audit committee
independence is insignificantly related to both ROE
and ROA, the H2 can be rejected for both
ROA and ROE.
3. There is no relationship between audit
committee expertise and ROA. This finding is
consistent with Jamil and Nelson (2011) in Malaysia
and Alqatamin (2018) in Jordan who find that audit
committee members‘ experience has no effect on
company performance (ROA). However, this is
inconsistent with Maina and Oluoch (2018) in Kenia,
who find that there is a significant relationship
between the frequency of audit committee meetings
and firm performance (ROA).
However, there is a significant relationship
between audit committee expertise and ROE at
a significant level less than (0.01) which is consistent
with Aanu et al. (2014) in Nigeria, Abdul Rahman
and Haneem Mohamed Ali (2006) in Malaysia,
Zábojníková (2016) in the UK, Salehi et al. (2018) in
Iran, and Baatwah et al. (2016) in emerging markets
who find that more committee members with
sufficient
financial
experience
can
enhance
the timeliness and the financial reporting quality
that lead to better financial performance. The
previous statistics in quality (Table 4) support this
result by showing that 69% of the selected
companies include, as a minimum, one member in
the audit committee having accounting or financial
or experience. This also justifies the Egyptian new
requirements for including one audit committee
member with accounting or financial experience.
Accordingly, the H3a can be rejected for
the ROA only and H3b accepted for ROE.
4. For gender diversity, there is no relationship
with
both
ROA
and
ROE
respectively.
The insignificant effect can be expected, in Egypt,
as there is low female participation found in
the Egyptian audit committees. This result is
consistent with Isidro and Sobral (2015), Ahern and
Dittmar (2012), and Kogut et al. (2014) who find that

a higher female representation in the committee
has no direct impact on the firm‘s value.
On the other hand, this is inconsistent with Miller
and del Carmen Triana (2009), Alqatamin (2018) in
Jordan, Abdelzaher and Abdelzaher (2019) in Egypt,
and Agyemang-Mintah and Schadewitz (2019)
in the UK who find a significant relation between
women participation and firm value (ROE). This also
supports the silence of the Egyptian Governance
Code regarding gender diversity requirements in
the audit committee structure. The descriptive
statistics discussed above in Table 4 show that
18.7% of the studied companies have only one
female member in their audit committees.
Accordingly, the H4 will be rejected for both
ROA and ROE.
5. Whereas there is no relationship between
the audit committee’s frequency of meetings and
both ROA and ROE. This finding is consistent with
the findings of Mohd Rahmat, Mohd Iskandar, and
Mohd Saleh (2009), Aanu et al. (2014) in Nigeria,
Bansal and Sharma (2016) in India, and Alqatamin
(2018) in Jordan that the number of meetings has no
effect on the firm financial performance. Having
more than four meetings could be wasteful to some
firms while for other organizations could be
sufficient.
However,
regardless
of
meeting
frequencies, the content to be discussed at these
meetings is more important than their frequency.
This explains what Table 4 shows that 60% of
the selected companies have audit committees that
meet every quarter of the year. This result is also in
accordance with that requirement of the Egyptian
Corporate
Governance
Code
that
the audit
committee should meet quarterly. More meetings
may have no effect.
However, this finding is inconsistent with that
of Jamil and Nelson (2011) in Malaysia, Zábojníková
(2016) in the UK, Maina and Oluoch (2018) in Kenia,
Alqatamin (2018) in Jordan, and Talpur et al. (2018)
in Malaysia that when the audit committee meets
more regularly, this could help in reducing
the agency problems and information asymmetry by
presenting fair and timely information to investors.
The finding regarding the insignificance of
the relationship found between the number of audit
committee meetings and ROE and ROA does not
support the H5. Thus, H5 can be rejected for both
ROA and ROE.
Finally, for all the research hypotheses, H1a
and H3b are only accepted and provide evidence
on the positive and significant relationship between
audit committee size and ROA, and between audit
committee experience and ROE.
The control variables correlation results show
the following:
1. Firm age is positively and significantly
correlated with ROA (0.22). This is consistent with
the finding of Mousa and Desoky (2012) as when
the firm gets older, they should have higher profits
due to the goodwill they have developed over time.
While the firm age is insignificantly correlated
with ROE (0.016) at a significant level greater than
(0.05). This is consistent with findings of Anderson
and Reeb (2003) that old firm not easily adopted
the new technologies.
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2. Firm leverage is negatively and significantly
correlated with ROA (-0.28) at a significant level less
than (0.05). This is consistent with the findings of
Olokoyo (2013), Gondrige et al. (2012), Fauzi and
Locke (2012), Lama (2012), and Jati Wibawaningsih
and Primta Surbakti (2020) that high leverage
resulted in lower ROA. Olokoyo (2013) in Nigeria and
Al-Matari et al. (2014) in Oman, show that high level
of debt decreased returns of firms.
Firm leverage is also positively and significantly
correlated with ROE (0.212) at a significant level less
than (0.05). This is inconsistent with Zábojníková
(2016) in the UK and Alqatamin (2018) in Jordan
who find insignificant relationship with ROE, as due
to the small firm effect theory — the small firms
have bigger amount of growth opportunities than
large companies.
3. There is a significant relationship between
the industry type and both ROA and ROE at
a significant level less than (0.1) This is inconsistent
with Alqatamin (2018) in Jordan who finds that
industry type has a positive impact on the firm‘s
performance.
4. Lastly, firm size is negatively and
insignificantly correlated with both ROA by (-0.20)
and ROE by (-0.017). This is consistent with
Alqatamin (2018) in Jordan, while it is inconsistent
with Al-Matari et al. (2014) in Oman, Zábojníková

(2016) in the UK who find a negative significant
relationship with ROE. Jati Wibawaningsih and
Primta Surbakti (2020) in Indonesia find a positive
significant correlation with ROA.
Finally, firm age and industry type are
significantly related to ROA and firm leverage is
negatively significant with ROA. Firm leverage and
industry type are positively significant with ROE.

4.5. Hausman test for correlated random effects
The main assumption for random effects estimation
that there is no correlation between the random
effects and the explanatory variables. Hausman
(1978) test is commonly used for testing this
assumption and to compare the fixed and random
effect estimates of coefficients.
In the Hausman test, the null hypothesis is that
the fixed effect model and random effect model
estimators do not differ significantly. The test
statistic developed by Hausman has an asymptotic χ2
distribution. If the null hypothesis is rejected,
the conclusion is that fixed effect model is better
to be used and the random effect model is not
appropriate.
When the Hausman test is performed here,
a model for ROA and ROE is first estimated with
random effects‘ specification as shown in Tables 11
and 12.

Table 11. Correlated random effects — Hausman test for ROA
Test cross-section random effects
Test summary
Cross-section random

Chi-sq. statistic
2.492406

Chi-sq. D.F.
8

Prob.
0.9621

Table 12. Correlated random effects — Hausman test for ROE

Test summary
Cross-section random

Test cross-section random effects
Chi-sq. statistic
10.075384

From Tables 11 and 12, the Hausman test
statistic calculated value, is insignificant at
a significant level greater than (0.05), thus, accepting
the
null
hypothesis
that
supporting
the
appropriateness of the random effects model and
rejecting the alternative hypothesis of the fixed
effects model.

Chi-sq. D.F.
8

Prob.
0.2598

performance), the correlation results from Table 9
(ROA) and 10 (ROE) are previously used in addition
to the results of the panel estimation model using
least squares for determining the effect of
independent variables on ROA in Table 13 and
the effect of independent variables on ROE in
Table 14 as follows.

4.6. Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
To
test
the
hypotheses
and
investigate
the relationship between the audit committee
characteristics and ROA and ROE (i.e., company
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Table 13. Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) model to determine the effect of independent variables
on ROA
Variable
ROA(-1)
ACMSIZE
ACINDE
ACEXP
ACMEET_1
ACFEMA
FSIZE
FAGE
FLEVER
INDTYP
C

Coefficient
0.513115
0.035819
-0.002903
-0.036190
0.024220
-0.001746
-0.000813
0.001238
-0.060016
0.035167
0.067758

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob. (F-statistic)

0.573155
0.463707
0.042854
5.236802
0.000075

R-squared
Sum squared resid.

0.573155
0.071623

Std. Error
t-statistic
0.078956
6.498769
0.016270
2.201480
0.010658
-0.272401
0.009169
-3.947000
0.025959
0.933008
0.005971
-0.292467
0.003542
-0.229615
0.000581
2.129915
0.021392
-2.805505
0.006115
5.751112
0.089036
0.761012
Weighted statistics
Mean dependent var.
S.D. dependent var.
Sum squared resid.
Durbin-Watson stat.
Unweighted statistics
Mean dependent var.
Durbin-Watson stat.

Prob.
0.0000
0.0313
0.7862
0.0002
0.3543
0.7709
0.8191
0.0370
0.0066
0.0000
0.4494
0.056828
0.058518
0.071623
2.503393

0.056828
2.503393

(2)

Table 14. Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) model to determine the effect of independent variables
on ROE
Variable
ROE(-1)
ACMSIZE
ACINDE
ACEXP
ACMEET_1
ACFEMA
FSIZE
FAGE
FLEVER
INDTYP
C

Coefficient
0.636049
0.055766
-0.028668
0.061596
0.037578
0.006717
-0.006633
0.001659
0.152562
0.067652
0.082329

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob. (F-statistic)

0.581445
0.460284
0.111421
4.798961
0.000133

R-squared
Sum squared resid.

0.581445
0.471754

Std. Error
t-statistic
0.056326
11.29230
0.045365
1.229273
0.023788
-1.205171
0.029883
2.061214
0.024071
1.561133
0.013951
0.481489
0.012934
-0.512850
0.001664
0.996605
0.071651
2.129237
0.016505
4.098840
0.319552
0.257639
Weighted statistics
Mean dependent var.
S.D. dependent var.
Sum squared resid.
Durbin-Watson stat.

Unweighted statistics
Mean dependent var.
Durbin-Watson stat.

Prob.
0.0000
0.2265
0.2356
0.0462
0.1268
0.6329
0.6110
0.3253
0.0332
0.0002
0.7981
0.182699
0.151664
0.471754
2.170642

0.182699
2.170642

(3)

the random error in the regression model or other
independent variables excluded from the regression
model. When the R2 value is high, this suggests
a better fit for the model.

4.6.1. The coefficient of determination: R2
ROA as a dependent variable
The adjusted R2 value of the model to determine
how the independent variables affect the ROA,
shown in Table 13, is equal to 46.3%. This means
that the independent variables in terms of audit
committee
size,
independence,
experience,
frequency of meetings, and gender diversity explain
46.3% of the total variation of the dependent
variable (ROA). The remaining 53.7% is due to either

ROE as a dependent variable
Table 14 shows that the adjusted R2 value of
the model to determine how the independent
variables can affect the ROE is equal to 46%. This
percentage implies that the independent variables in
terms of audit committee size, independence,
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experience, no of meetings, and gender diversity
explain 46% of the total variation of the dependent
variable (ROA). The remaining 54% is due to either
the random error in the regression model or other
independent variables excluded from the regression
model. A high R2 value may suggest a better fit for
the model.

(H0) that the residuals are normally distributed is not
rejected, and it can be concluded that the observed
distribution corresponds to or equal the theoretical
distribution, i.e., the observed errors are normally
distributed.

4.6.2. F-test

Theil‘s U inequality is used to measure the accuracy
of the estimates of the random effects model.
Its value is between zero and one, where zero shows
a perfect fit. Since a value reaches (0.24) for ROA
(Figure 3 in the Appendix) and (0.21) for ROE
(Figure 4 in the Appendix) indicating the goodness
of fit of the panel model, at a percent of not less
than (76%) for ROA and (79%) for ROE, respectively.

4.6.5. Theil’s U inequality coefficient

F-test is generally used to determine if there is
a linear relationship between the dependent variable
and some independent variables. Since the value of
F-test is (5.2) for ROA (Table 13) and (4.7) for ROE
(Table 14) at a significant level less than (0.05), then
it is concluded that the independent variables have
affected the level of ROA and ROE.

4.6.6. The Durbin-Watson test statistic

4.6.3. T-test

This test has the null hypothesis that the ordinary
least-squares regression has its residuals that are
not auto-correlated. This is tested against
the alternative hypothesis that the residuals are
an autoregressive integrated (AR1), positive firstorder autocorrelation process. The Durbin-Watson
statistic value ranges from 0 to 4. Nonautocorrelation exists when the value is close to 2;
a value toward 0 indicates positive autocorrelation;
negative autocorrelation is when the value is
toward 4. Since the test statistic value (2.5) for ROA
and (2.17) for ROE are greater than dU, the null
hypothesis would not be rejected.

It is important to determine each of the individual
independent variables‘ coefficient significant value
in the regression model. Table 13 shows that
the most significant independent variables for
the ROA model: ACMSIZE, FAGE, FLEVER, and
INDTYP at a significant level less than (0.05). This
result supports the previous Chi-square test
discussed above in accordance with Table 9b and
helps in testing the research hypotheses regarding
the impact of the characteristics of the audit
committee on the ROA.
Table 14
shows
the
most
significant
independent variables for the ROE model: ACEXP,
FLEVER and INDTYP at a significant level less than
(0.05). This result supports the previous Chi-square
results shown in Table 10b that have been used
above in testing the research hypotheses regarding
the significance of the effect of the audit committee
characteristics on the ROE.

4.6.7. Residual cross-section dependence test
Table 15 for the ROA and Table 16 for the ROE show
the significance of both Breusch-Pagan LM, and
Pesaran scaled LM tests as the p-values are less
than 0.05. Accordingly, the null hypothesis of
no correlation will be rejected at conventional
significance levels.
While the last Pesaran CD test is asymptotically
standard normal, and the null hypothesis of no
correlation is strongly accepted due to the test
statistic results at conventional levels, i.e., there is no
cross-section dependence (correlation) in residuals.

4.6.4. The Jarque-Bera test
Since it
the test
(Figure 1
(Figure 2

is found that the significance value of
statistic (≥ 0.05) is (0.7302) for ROA
in the Appendix) and (0.14) for ROE
in the Appendix), then the null hypothesis

Table 15. Residual cross-section dependence test for ROA
Test
Breusch-Pagan LM
Pesaran scaled LM
Pesaran CD

Statistic
511.8134
7.626626
-0.500722

D.F.
300

Prob.
0.0000
0.0000
0.6166

Table 16. Residual cross-section dependence test for ROE
Test
Breusch-Pagan LM
Pesaran scaled LM
Pesaran CD

Statistic
600.0000
11.22683
0.979796

D.F.
300

Prob.
0.0000
0.0000
0.3272

findings that the audit committee characteristics can
help in improving the company performance, which
motivated the researcher here for more investigation
in Egypt. This investigated period (2016–2018) is
after several accounting reforms introduced
by the Egyptian Government for strengthening
the corporate
governance
practices
especially,
the audit committee role and new securities exchange

5. CONCLUSION
This
paper
investigated
to
what
extent
the requirements of the audit committee can
enhance the firm performance among the listed
Egyptian companies in different sectors and after
excluding the banks and financial intuitions for
the period of 2016–2018. The literature reported
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laws are issued. This new reform took place in 2016
and requires that the audit committee should have
a minimum of three non-executive board members,
of which one member should have accounting or
financial experience. The audit committee should
also meet on a quarterly basis at least.
One of the main findings of this study is that
audit committee size and their experience, as
members, all have a positive impact on firm
performance. Furthermore, audit committee size
influences ROA, and audit committee experience
influences ROE.
The significance of the audit committee size
effect is consistent with what the resource
dependence theory states that better results are
expected to form a bigger audit committee due to
the diversity in skills and knowledge its members
can have. Actually, this study found that 72% of
the selected companies have only three audit
committee members and the remaining 28% have
four or more committee members. This can justify
why the new Egyptian updated governance rules
require that the audit committee be comprised of
at least three members.
The results regarding the significant impact of
the financial expertise are consistent with
the Egyptian
legislation
that
required
audit
committees to include one member with financial
experience as a minimum number. Statistics show
that 69% of the investigated companies have one
financial expert in their audit committee.
This finding is also consistent with Aanu et al.
(2014) in Nigeria, Rashidah and Fairuzana (2006)
in Malaysia, Zábojníková (2016) in the UK, Salehi
et al. (2018) in Iran, Alzeban (2020) in Saudi Arabia
and the UAE, Dakhlallh et al. (2020) in Jordan, and
Baatwah et al. (2016) in emerging markets who
find that more committee members with sufficient
financial experience can enhance the financial
reporting quality and financial performance in turn.
While the Egyptian regulators stress that not
less than 4 committee meetings should be held in
a year, the study found that the audit committee
meetings frequency had no effect on ROA and ROE.
Accordingly, it can be recommended now that
no more than these 4 meetings to be held in a year
for reducing any more expenses that can be incurred
with every meeting, otherwise these too many
meetings can negatively affect the firm performance.
Actually, it is found that 69% of the companies
included in this study have an audit committee that
meets every quarter of the year. This finding is also
in contrast to the resource dependence theory that
predicts that a high number of audit committee
meetings can result in higher firm performance.
Thus, Egyptian regulators can be advised not to
increase the required number of audit committee
meetings by more than 4 meetings per year, seeking
higher firm performance.
However,
both
the
audit
committee
independence
and
gender
diversity
have
an insignificant relationship with ROA and ROE. This
finding is inconsistent with those of Bozec (2005),
Bradbury et al. (2006), and Reddy et al. (2011).
The result, concerning the insignificant effect
of the audit committee independence, supports
the stewardship theory that the independent
directors, who have insufficient technical knowledge,
can consequently lead them to make inconvenient

recommendations for the audit committee. However,
this finding is inconsistent with the agency theory
which emphasizes that the agency costs can be
reduced by the audit committee‘s independence.
This result must draw the attention of Egyptian
regulators who constantly ask for an increase
in the independence of audit committees as
the descriptive statistics show that 77% of
the selected companies have independent members
in their audit committee.
In contrast, the insignificance impact of gender
diversity is consistent with the silence of
the Egyptian Corporate Governance Code concerning
female participation in the audit committee. It is
found that only 18.7% of the companies included
in this study have only one female member out of all
the audit committee members, while the majority
have no female member. This finding is also
inconsistent with many other researchers (e.g., Isidro
& Sobral, 2015; Kogut et al. 2014).
Briefly, the findings of this study regarding
the significant impact of the audit committee size
and experience can stimulate the government and
the policymakers in making the Egyptian corporate
governance code recommendations mandatory not
optional as it is in the current situation, that results
in the limited implementation of the governance
code by all the companies.
The study findings also show that firm age can
positively and significantly affect both ROA and
ROE. This may be as the firm gets older, it becomes
more experienced in generating more profits. Firm
leverage and size have an impact on ROA only and
no effect on ROE. Industry type has no effect on
both ROA and ROE.
As in every study, there are some limitations.
First, the study focuses only on the audit committee
role as only one of the corporate governance pillars.
Second, the study is limited to only 25 listed
Egyptian companies from various sectors due to
the lack of data and the audit-committee-related
information is very limited in Egypt. Third, this
study finding cannot be generalized to other
countries (particularly developed countries) that
have different market regulations and high investor
protection, less family and concentrated ownership,
high reliance on public debt. In developing
countries, like Egypt, where the market is inefficient
and there are less transparent financial statements
and less sophisticated users, the financial statement
users are less likely to be able to see through
the manipulated earnings. Fourth, the implementation
of the Egyptian Corporate Governance Code
recommendations is limited as they are not
mandatory.
Finally,
the
study
results
can
help
the professional accountancy bodies and Egyptian
regulators in improving the effectiveness and
the role of the audit committees, and other
corporate governance practices for more transparent
financial statements, less earnings manipulation,
and in turn, more investors‘ confidence and more
foreign investments. This is much needed nowadays
in Egypt especially after the adoption of
the sustainable development strategy in its new
vision 2020–2030, and including it as a part of
the stock exchange‘s strategy. Such results, however,
are based mainly on studying the non-financial most
active listed firms. Accordingly, it is recommended
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that future studies may concentrate on the banking
sector, which plays a vital role in emerging
economies, particularly Egypt. Future studies can
also examine whether the characteristics of the audit

committee have an impact on other factors, such as
earnings management practices and disclosures
quantity and quality, as well as different analytical
methods to obtain more accurate research results.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1. Jarque-Bera test for ROA
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Figure 2. Jarque-Bera test for ROE
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Figure 3. Theil‘s U inequality coefficient for ROA
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Figure 4. Theil‘s U inequality coefficient for ROE
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